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RECENT CASES
BILLS OF SALF-CHATTEL MORTGAGES-CONDMIONAL BILLS OF SALE--FING.
Vendee purchased goods which he left in possession of the vendor, and
obtained a bill of sale which he filed eleven months later, although the
recording statute provided that recording be within ten days. Six days
subsequent to the recording of the bill of sale, the vendor executed a
chattel mortgage to defendant on the vendee's goods which had been left
in his possession. This was filed the following day. Vendee brought action
to cancel the chattel mortgage and quiet his title. Held: Under RIE. REv.
STAT. § 5827, a bill of sale, even though not recorded within the required
ten-day period, when recorded, will be good as against all who have not
at that time acquired a specific lien against the property. Chattel mort-
gage canceled. Umbarger v. Berrian, 95 Wash. Dec. 289, 80 P. (2d) 818
(1938).
The Washington bill of sales act provides, "No bill of sale for the
transfer of personal property, shall be valid as against existing creditors,
or innocent purchasers, where the property is left in the possession of the
vendor, unless the said bill of sale be recorded in the auditor's office of
the county in which the property is situated, within ten days after such
sale shall be made." REM REV. STAT. § 5827.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in an early case construing the bill
of sale statute (See HIr's CODE § 1454, BALLINGE'S CODE § 4578), which was
the same mutatis mutandis as the coexisting conditional sales statute (See
BALLINGER'S CODE § 4585) and the chattel mortgage statute (Id. § 4558).
held that a failure to record the bill of sale within the required ten-day
period would protect only such parties as had obtained intervening rights
after the execution of the instrument and before it was finally filed for
record. Sayward v. Nunan, 6 Wash. 87, 32 Pac. 1022 (1893). Intervening
rights were impliedly defined as specific liens acquired on the property.
See also Malmo v. Rendering & Fertilizing Co., 79 Wash. 534, 140 Pac.
569 (1914).
An identical result was reached in cases involving the application of
the conditional sales statute, Malmo v. Rendering & Fertilizing Co., supra;
Eilers Music House v. Ritner, 88 Wash. 218, 154 Pac. 789 (1915); and the
chattel mortgage statute, Heal v. Evans Creek Coal & Coke Co., 71 Wash.
228, 123 Pac. 211 (1912); Paciftc Coast Biscuit Co. v. Perry, 77 Wash. 352,
137 Pac. 483 (1914).
The conditional sales statute and the chattel mortgage statute, however,
were amended by the Laws of 1915, Chap. 95 and 96, pp. 276, 277, wherein
it was provided that all creditors, whether or not they had or claimed a
lien on the property would be protected by the statutes; with the result
that a chattel morgage will be void, and a conditional sale absolute, as to
all creditors or encumbrancers unless the instrument is filed within ten
days; and that a filing later than the ten-day period will carry no legal
effect. Clark v. Killian, 117 Wash. 532, 199 Pac. 121 (1921); Fleming v.
Lincoln Trust Co., 124 Wash. 31, 213 Pac. 480 (1923); see Ayer, Conditional
Sales, 13 WASH. L. REv. 47, 48.
The bill of sales statute has not been amended or changed, and by
the instant case it is clear that a distinction now exists between the record-
ing of a bill of sale on one hand, and the filing of a conditional bill of sale
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or chattel mortgage on the other, namely: a conditional bill of sale will be
absolute and a chattel mortgage void unless filed within the ten-day
period, even though thereafter filed; whereas a bill of sale will be valid
whether filed before or after the statutory period as against all who have
not acquired a lien on the property before the actual filing.
M. D. L.
Canvufmm LAw-TRIAL By JURY-WArvER. Defendant, charged with homi-
cide, waived trial by jury. The result of trial before the court was a
conviction of the crime of manslaughter. Held: Appellant is entitled to a
trial by jury, a right which was not afforded him. State v. Karsunky, 97
Wash. Dec. 76, 84 P. (2d) 390 (1938). Likewise, where defendant is on trial
for a misdemeanor. State v. McCaw, 98 Wash. Dec. 308, - P. (2d) -
(1939).
In absence of statutory authority the general rule is that one who is
charged with the commission of a felony cannot, on pleading not guilty,
waive his right to trial by jury. Annotations 48 A. L. R. 767 and 58 A. L. R.
1031.
The instant case did not come under the general rule but was decided
on the basis of express statutory provision. REM. Rxv. STAT.. § 2309. This
was held to repeal by implication, Wash. Laws 1854, p. 119, § 108, REA.
REv. STAT. § 2144, authorizing a waiver in other than capital cases. The
court here ruled, "Not only is there an absence of statutory authority to
waive trial by jury but the right to waive, except in the two instances
cited, is taken away." (Plea of guilty or confession in open court: § 2309.)
This construction of the statute would seem to mean not only that it
is for the protection of the accused, but also the policy of the state that
the accused be tried by a jury. Certain constitutional and statutory provi-
sions for the protection of the accused my be waived in this state. State v.
Alexander, 65 Wash. 488, 118 Pac. 645 (1911) (right to speedy trial); State
v. Miller, 72 Wash. 154, 129 Pac. 1100 (1913) (same); State v. Quinn, 56
Wash. 295, 105 Pac. 818 (1909) (right to be served with a copy of the
information); State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194, 122 Pac. 995, 39 L. R. A. (N.s.) 611
(1912) (plea of former jeopardy).
The theory that public policy requires that the accused be tried by
jury may be questioned. Situations may arise in which the defendant
would rather be tried by the court. In cases involving crimes of a shock-
ing nature or race prejudice public sentiment may run high. The defend-
ant might receive a more just trial before the court than before men who
are apt to be swayed by current feeling. Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by
Jury in Criminal Cases, (1927) 25 MicH. L. Rxv. 695.
The guarantee found in the U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, clause 3, and the
Sixth Amendment confers a privilege upon the defendant which he may
be allowed to waive. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1929). These
provisions seem as mandatory as that contained in the WAsH. CONST. art.
1, § 21. In a case decided before the enactment of Ram2. Rzv. STAT. § 2309,
under facts similar to those in Patton v. United States, supra, it was held
that the court was without jurisdiction to try a case with but eleven jurors,
even with the consent of the defendant, as no provision for such tribunal
had ever been made. State v. Ellis, 22 Wash. 129, 60 Pac. 136 (1900). On
this question see Annotations 70 A. L. R. 279. Dictum in the case is to
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the effect that while the legislature cannot take the right away, it may
authorize waiver.
The right to trial by jury is not of such fundamental importance as
to be ihcluded within the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900).
It would seem inconsistent that the right to a jury trial in criminal cases
is not within the "due process" clause, but is of such fundamental im-
portance to the state that it cannot be waived by the accused. It is sub-
mitted that the accused should have the right to waive trial by jury In
criminal cases. If he were to have this privilege criminal procedure might
be expedited. There are numerous decisions upholding the constitution-
ality of positive legislative enactments to such effect, collected in 48 A.
L. R. 772. Whether such legislation here would be upheld depends upon
the interpretation of our constitutional provision. The court might feel
that it is for the personal security of the accused, in which case it could
be waived; or it might be construed as declaring a general state policy to
require jury trial, in which case no waiver would be possible without a
constitutional amendment to that effect.
H. A. B.
EVnmsxcE--ADnmSSmnLTY OF EvmcNE OF PAsT CvMIES To SHOW MoTIVE.
In a prosecution for first degree murder, evidence of former crimes and
misconduct by the defendants was admitted, the state contending that
the evidence was relevant to show motive. Particularly, the state's con-
tention appears to have been that because the evidence indicated that the
deceased knew of the former crimes, it was permissible to infer that the
motive for the homicide consisted in the desire of the defendants to
prevent disclosure by the deceased. There was no evidence tending to
show that the deceased had threatened to make such disclosure or that the
defendants had reason to believe that she was going to do so. Held: That
the evidence of the former offenses and misconduct was properly admitted.
State v. Richardson, 97 Wash. Dec. 137, 84 P. (2d) 699 (1938).
Ordinarily, evidence of other offenses, even though of a similar sort,
is not admissible. But evidence which is relevant to some particular issue
does not become inadmissible merely because it tends to establish the
commission of some other offense by the defendant. State v. Gaines, 144
Wash. 446, 258 Pac. 508 (1927); State v. Larson, 119 Wash. 123, 204 Pac.
1041 (1922). "A party cannot by multiplying his crimes diminish the
volume of competent evidence given against him." People v. Thau, 219
N. Y. 39, 113 N. E. 556 (1916). It is always proper and relevant for the
state to show motive, and such proof becomes particularly important where
the state's case depends, as it did here, upon circumstantial evidence.
O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 354, 12 E. W. 471 (1889); State v. Gaines,
supra; 1 WHARTON, CanVuNAL EvmEmcE (11th ed., 1937) § 351.
But was the evidence in the principal case relevant to show motive?
Without some evidence that the deceased had threatened to make dis-
closure of the defendants' criminal acts and misconduct or that the de-
fendants believed or had reason to believe that she would do so, there is
doubt of the probative value of the evidence. The question of relevancy
in a situation of this nature should be scrutinized with unrelaxed vigilance
by the court because of the prejudicial character of the evidence, if mis-
used by the jury. Billings i. State, 52 Ark. 303, 12 S. W. 574 (1899) , State
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v. Hakon, 21 N. D. 133, 129 N. W. 234 (1910); Commonwealth v. Habecher,
113 Pa. Super. 335, 173 Atl. 831 (1934). The possibility, if not the likelihood,
of such prejudicial misuse grows more apparent where, as in this case,
the former crimes and misconduct were of a sordid and repulsive char-
acter. 1 WHARTON, CRIVMIAL EVIDENCE § 360. ". . . If we are too liberal or
too loose in exacting relevancy or probative value for the allowable pur-
poses, we admit evidence whose dominant bearing is a dangerous and
forbidden one. Greater care and caution is thus called for in applying
to this class of evidence the tests of relevancy for design, motive, and
the like." 1 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 216.
It is submitted that to permit evidence of prior crimes and misconduct
to come in upon the mere showing that the deceased knew of them is to
cut very deeply into the exclusionary policy against such evidence and
to establish a precedent fraught with considerable danger.
J. HL J.
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY-PREPONDERANCE OF THE EviDENcE-QUALIFYING
WoRDs. In an action to recover double indemnity under a policy of life
insurance, the defense was suicide. The trial court instructed the jury
that the burden was upon the defendant "to establish to your satisfaction,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the death of [the assured] was
not accidental and unintentional but that he committed suicide." Defend-
ant excepted to the instruction as putting upon it too great a burden.
Held: That the instruction was not improper. Alverson v. Kansas City
Life Insurance Co., 96 Wash. Dec. 43, 32 P. (2d) 149 (1938).
At the trial defendant conceded that the burden of persuasion as to
suicide rested upon it and upon this concession was permitted to open and
close the case. Defendant contended, however, that its burden was merely
to produce a preponderance of evidence on the issue, not necessarily to
"satisfy" the jury of the fact of suicide. But the court, relying on Carstens
v. Earles, 26 Wash. 676, 67 Pac. 404 (1901) (preponderance of the evidence
satisfactory to your minds), which had been predicated on Callan v. Han-
son, 86 Iowa 420, 53 N. W. 282 (1892) (if from a preponderance of the
evidence you are satisfied), held that the instruction, in effect, did no more
than require the jury to "find" or "believe" (from a preponderance) that
deceased committed suicide. Yet it seems there is substantial merit to the
contention that the instruction, as it was likely to be understood by the
jury, did require the defendant to do something more than merely pro-
duce a preponderance, i. e., to produce a preponderance which "satisfied"
the jury of the fact of suicide. While the difference may be technical,
even slight, it is perhaps worth noting that in the instructions in the cited
cases the phrase objected to was "tacked on", while in the principal case
it is placed in a stronger position and is also likely to receive more em-
phasis in view of the fact that satisfaction is a term familiar to and well
understood by the juror, while preponderance of the evidence probably is
not.
In Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Owsley, 3 Wash. Terr. 38, 13
Pac. 186 (1888) not cited by either counsel or the court in the principal
case, an instruction which required the defendant to establish an affirma-
tive defense "by a preponderance of the evidence, and to your satisfaction"
was condemned as too rigorous, the court holding that "from this the jury
would naturally understand that the burden was on the defendant to
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prove his defense to a greater degree of certainty than that afforded by
a mere preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, they might even be led
to think that this defense needed to be established beyond every reason-
able doubt." The use of the conjunctive may be a difference of substance,
but still the instruction in the Owsley case appears very close, at least
in its meaning to a lay auditor, to that in the principal case.
In State v. Harris, 74 Wash. 60, 132 Pac. 735 (1913), an instruction putting
upon the defendant the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance
and that the jury '!must conscientiously believe", "must really believe"
the defendant to have been insane, and that "your verdict must be the
truth", was also held erroneous, as was the phrase "to establish to your
minds and conscience by a preponderance of the evidence". McKay V.
Seattle Electric Co., 75 Wash. 257, 136 Pac. 134 (1913).
The Owsley case appears to be in line with outside authority. New
York Central Railroad Co. v. Sentle, 132 Ohio State 387, 8 N. E. (2d) 149
(1936), which probably represents the prevailing view, condemned an
instruction identical in terms with that in the principal case. Accord:
Midland Valley R. Co. v. Barnes, 182 Okla. 44, 18 P. (2d) 1089 (1933);
cf. Teter v. Spooner, 305 ]11. 198, 137 N. E. 129 (1922). There are cases to
the contrary: Sale v. Illinois Electric Co., 114 Cal. App. 71, 299 Pac. 564
(1931); Sufferling v. Heyl & Patterson, 139 Wis. 510, 121 N. W. 251 (1909).
IL M. T.
INSURANCE-BREACH or CooPmrATIoN CLAusE. In an action against plain-
tiff's indemnity insurer, defendant pleaded breach of the cooperation
clause, in that plaintiff's testimony at the trial that his truck at the time
of the accident was loaned, deprived defendant of a defense based upon
plaintiff's prior signed statement that it was leased. Held: To cooperate
means to give a full, frank, and fair disclosure of all information reason-
ably requested by the insurer to enable it to determine whether it had a
defense, and that the total variance between testimony and statement
constituted a breach of the cooperation clause relieving defendant of
liability. Hilliard v. United Pacific Casualty Insurance Company, 95 Wash.
Dec. 399, 81 P. (2d) 513 (1938).
The cooperation clause in the case read, "... the assured must co-
operate fully with the company in immediately disclosing all the facts
known to him about the happening of every accident . . ." In general,
breaches of such a clause are either by some form of conduct, or by a
variation between statement given after the accident and the testimony
given on trial. Where conduct of the assured is involved, the question
becomes one of fact in each case to determine whether the non-coopera-
tion was material. 72 A. L. R. 1454.
In Washington, the signing of a statement admitting negligence is a
breach of the clause. Koontz v. General Casualty Co., 162 Wash. 77, 297
Pac. 1081 (1931). Failure to appear at the trial is a breach, Eakle v. Hayes,
185 Wash. 520, 55 P. (2d) 1072 (1936), unless the assured has been trans-
ferred by his employer and will not come because the insurance company
will not pay his wages plus expenses. Lienhard v. Northwestern Mutual
Fire Assn., 187 Wash. 47, 59 P. (2d) 916 (1936). It is not a breach to
disclose to the other party the fact of insurance. Hopkins v. American
Fidelity Co., 91 Wash. 680, 158 Pac. 535 (1916).
It is generally held that a change in the account of the facts as given
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by the assured will not alone avoid the policy when there is no finding
of bad faith. Guerin v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 107
Conn. 649, 142 AtI. 268 (1928); Finkle v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 224
Mo. App. 285, 26 S. W. (2d) 843 (1930). The only two Washington cases
dealing with this point prior to the instant case were Moran Bros. Co. v.
Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 48 Wash. 592, 94 Pac. 106 (1908); and Taxicab
Motor Co. v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 73 Wash. 631, 132 Pac. 393 (1913).
In the Moran Bros. case the assured sent to the insurer a statement that
the injured person was contributorily negligent; which was false. On
discovery of this at the trial, the insurance company withdrew, alleging
breach of the cooperation clause, but it was held that a mistake, in good
faith, in giving a version of the facts is not a breach. In the Taxicab Motor
Co. case, the officer of the plaintiff gave testimony at the inquest which
differed from that he gave at the trial, and which was used at the trial
to impeach him. This was held not sufficient to avoid the policy since the
answers were made in good faith and were not wilfully false, and since
the prior inconsistent testimony did not affect the jury.
Thus, until the Hilliard case, the Washington cases on this point fol-
lowed the majority rule, holding that where no bad faith was shown, the
mere fact that testimony at the trial differed from the statement made
to the insurer, was insufficient in itself to avoid the assured's policy. The
test as laid down in the Hilliard case seems to be whether or not the
testimony at the trial is "wholly at variance" with the previous story
of the assured. If the testimony is "wholly at variance" there need be
no finding of bad faith or of wilfully false testimony. It will remain for
the court to define just what the phrase "wholly at variance" means, and
whether the general rule that some bad faith must be proved before the
clause will be said to be breached, is to be overthrown.
J. M. D.
